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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANA PHELPS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RELIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY
SAINTS,

Case No.
10892

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action instituted against a Licensed Child
Placement Agency praying for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
commanding the Defendant to return control and custody of
an infant child.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From an Order, J udgment and Decree for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant respondent urges the Supreme Court to affirm and sustain the findings of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Dana Phelps is a 35 year old woman (Tr. 8)
who gave birth to a child at the University Hospital on
December 17, 1966. (Tr. 9) Dana is unmarried and was not
married at the time of conception or birth of the child.
(Tr. 10) The child was conceived in March of 1966. (Tr. 9)
She moved to Salt Lake City in September of 1966 after
learning of her pregnancy. (Tr. 10) Here she consulted Dr.
Hebertson, an obstetrician. (Tr. 12) Dana was previously
acquainted with Dr. Hebertson because of a p:rior unrelated
hospitalization. (Tr. 12)
In the latter part of September or the first of October,
Dana discussed with Dr. Hebertson the possible placement
of her child for adoption when it was born. (Tr. 12) She
was told she could go through the L.D.S. Church adoption
agency if she didn't want to see Father Brusatto of Catholic
Charities. She was not told which placement she should
pursue. Dr. Hebertson did, however, suggest this one with
the Church. (Tr. 13) After several consultations with Dr.
Hebertson, Dana was told that if she wanted to go through
the L.D.S. adoption center he would make an appointment.
Dana told the doctor "yes" she would appreciate it if he
would. (Tr. 14) An appointment was made with Mrs.
Bridgewater, Social Worker for the University Hospital and
subsequently with Mrs. Stewart of the Relief Society. (Tr.
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15) Prior to the birth of the child Dana had just one visit
with Mrs. Stewart. (Tr. 15) Dana sought no other advice or
counsel. (Tr. 16) On the occasion of Dana's visit with Mrs.
Stewart Dana was informed what the procedures for adoption would be and was shown the paper that she would have
to sign. (Tr. 19) This conversation occurred September 28,
1966. (Tr. 61) During said conversation Dana informed
Mrs. Stewart that she had already decided to place her child.
Inquiry was made concerning the possibility of marriage
which appeared to be out of question. (Tr. 61) Dana cooperated fully at that time, but refused counseling. She
declined to discuss a wage home situation. (Tr. 62) On
December 17, 1966 Mrs. Stewart called Dana at the University Hospital by telephone. At that time Dana was informed
·that Mrs. Stewart was aware of her hospitalization. Mrs.
Stewart explained that seldom does the agency come on the
day of delivery and that she would come the day following.
Mrs. Stewart asked Dana if she was ready to follow through
on the plans she had previously made and Dana said yes.
Mrs. Stewart was unable to set the hour on the following
day that she was to be the:re. Dana responded "fine." (Tr.
63) On the 18th when Mrs. Stewart arrived at the University Hospital Dana's brother Mr. Phelps was in the room.
He started to leave, was invited to stay, but declined. (Tr.
63, 64) The time of the hospital visit by Mrs. Stewart was
fixed at 3 :05 P.M. (Tr. 38) During the conversation that
ensued Dana immediately recognized Mrs. Stewart even
though they had met only once before. Mrs. Stewart visited
with her, expressing concern about the delivery and "all
that goes on there." Dana responded "just as normally as
she did on the first day I met her." (Tr. 64) Mrs. Stewart
asked Dana whether or not she wanted to follow through

with the Release and she said "yes I might as well." Mrs.
Stewart said "please read it, I don't want you to sign
anything that you are not well acquainted with." Dana was
acquainted with the Release in the office in September. Mrs.
Stewart sat quietly while Dana read every part of the Release. (Tr. 65) Dana inquired how to fill out the forms and
was told to use her full legal name. A meaningful conversation transpired in which a discussion occurred about the
placement of the child. (Tr. 65) Mrs. Stewart responded to
Dana by informing her that the child could be placed before Christmas. (Tr. 66) The Release was not only signed
by Dana but was completed in form in Dana's handwriting.
(Tr. 66) and (Tr. 27)
A significant part of the conversation occurring on the
afternoon of December 18th, between Dana and Mrs. Stewart is related on Page 74 of the Transcript. Dana in response
to the proffer of the Release said "I might as well do it now."
Mrs. Stewart construed this as "an unequivocal consent to
the adoption, considering the fact that this was the direction
in which the groundwerk had been laid. There was no uncertainty at any time on her part shown." (Tr. 74)
Shortly thereafter the child was placed for adoption.
On December 21, 1966 Dana executed an authority for hospital release of the child. This form was witnessed by Corinne B, Bridgewaters, Social Worker for the University
Hospital (See medical records Exhibit P. 1, page 6) The
circumstances surrounding the execution of this document
are related by Mrs. Bridgewaters. On December 19th Mrs.
Bridgewaters visited with Dana at 9 :00 o'clock in the morning. She asked Dana if she was ready and took it in a positive way that Dana was still planning on going through with
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her adoption. Dana told Mrs. Bridgewaters that Mrs. Stewart had been in to see here and had taken the adoption Release. Dana "seemed to be relieved" and Dana said "I'm glad
it's all over." At this point Mrs. Bridgewaters informed Dana
that she would return the following day to obtain the signature on the Hospital Release of the Child. (Tr. 114.) This
release should not be confused with the mother's consent to
adoption. The conversation also was "meaningful" and
Dana said that she felt fine. (Tr. 115) It should be noted
that Dana was acquainted with Mrs. Bridgewaters having
met her originally on September 23, 1966 in Mrs. Bridewaters' office (Tr. 111 At that meeting Mrs. Bridgewaters
relates ''there was not too much to making this decision
of adoption, Dana seemed to have this already planned
and of course I, after explaining my role, asked Dana
specifically if this is what she wanted to do ... I thought
it was significant that Dana wanted to place her baby
and she said that she had heard about the L.D.S. Relief
Society and wanted to place her baby and I know by my
records and after I talked with Dana I found out that she
was Catholic and I commented that her being Catholic and
if she wouldn't want to place the baby there. But that it was
her decision and any of these agencies were very good and
I pointed out too ... we talked about four agencies and the
Child Welfare... " (Tr. 112) Dana and Mrs. Bridgewaters
discussed the alternatives of her keeping the child but Dana
felt that an adoption was the best thing to do. She indicated
no overt feelings around the influence from her family.
(Tr. 113)
While the child was delivered by a caesarean section, the
circumstances of delivery, the patient's progress and medi-
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cation given were not unordinary. She was fatigued but
comfortable. She slept throughout the night (Tr. 86) and
in the early morning hour, at 5 :00 o'clock was given Visterol, which is a sedative and histamine, a non-narcotic. At
12 :30 P.M. she was given a minimal dose of demerol and a
repeat of Visterol. At 5 :40 A.M. on the morning of December 18th she received 10 miligrams of morphine. (Tr. 87, 88)
The dosage given was considered by the doctor to be small.
(Tr. 88) According to the doctor, the dosage of Demerol
given at 9 :40 in the morning would have worn off two hours
after. (Tr. 92) During the day the doctor was in the hospital
and visited with Dana on several occasions. He documents
a visit at 6 :00 in the afternoon. The doctor found no indication of sleep deprivation (Tr. 93) and no evidence of idiosyncracies which would cause an unexpected reaction to the
medications given. It was the doctor's opinion that Dana
was fully competent on the 18th of December to sign the
requested Release document. The testimony of Dr. Hebertson as contained in Transcript 93, 94, 95, and 96 is most
significant in this regard.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF
THE RELEASE AND CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION
OF HER INFANT SON HAD FULL UNDERSTANDING
OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCE OF HER ACT
AND WAS NOT ACTING UNDER SUCH UNDUE INFLUENCE, RESTRAINT, MENACE, FRAUD OR OTHER
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ACTION AS TO RENDER HER ACT AN INVOLUNTARY ONE.
Counsel for Appellant argues that at no time did Dana
ever unequivocally express her desire to release her child or
place the same for adoption. The record discloses a pattern
of behavior which can only reasonably be construed as an
unequivocal decision to proceed. Her conversation with the
doctor in which she solicited his advice and her statement
to him that she would like him to arrange the appointment
with the agency is suggestive of this fact. (Tr. 14) Dana
further informed Mrs. Stewart of her desire to proceed with
the adoption without regard to the other services that the
agency afforded, such as counseling. (Tr. 61)
Dana at no time, to the social worker, the doctor, the
nurse or the agency representative expressed indecision or
hesitancy about her predetermined course of action.
Her assertion that she was under undue influence was
unconvincing to the trial court, and is not supported under
the facts.
One raises the question, "Did Dr. Hebertson exercise
undue influence?" Dr. Hebertson was a confident of Dana.
He had become acquainted with her previously and she had
sought him out for treatment and consultation in connection
with the problems incident to her pregnancy. (Tr. 12) Who
is better able to advise a patient concerning matters which
are both physical and emotional than her own selected
physician? We refer the Court to the case In Re Adoption of
a Minur, 79 App. DC 191, 144 F 2d 644, 156 ALR 1001, in
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which it was held that since the originally executed consent
was made with the advice of a family physician and since
the mother and her parents had considered the matter for
some time previously the contention that the consent was
not voluntarily given or was without knowledge of its consequences was without merit.
Consider the case of In Re Adoption of D ...... 122
Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223. In this case the trial court found
that Appellant was not a victim of duress or undue influence. She had had many months to consider the matter. She
had had conferences with her grandmother, and other relatives, and with counsel for the Respondent in that case and
thereafter voluntarily appeared before the Court where she
was questioned concerning her attitude and desires and
where she freely signed the relinquishment and consent.
Dana, too, had many months to consider her course of
action. Some four months prior to the birth of the child she
made contact with the agency by appointment through the
offices of Dr. Hebertson. Dr. Hebertson had offered to make
the appointment if she desired to go through with an adoption. Dana's answer to this inquiry was that she did and
would appreciate it if he would make such an appointment.
(Tr. 14)

Counsel for Appellant suggests that Dana was under
the influence of medication or narcotic which so impaired
her judgment as to render her act involuntary. In support
of this position Appellant brings into the Court the testimony of Dr. Clark, a psychiatrist. Let us analyze Dr. Clark's
position in this matter.
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1. He was not the attending physician. (Tr. 52) and
(Tr.42)
2. He had never seen Dana until the day before trial.
At the time of this examination he gave her no medication.
He did not observe her personally under the influence of
any narcotic drug or synthetic narcotic. (Tr. 52)
3. In answer to the question, "Doctor, in your opinion
would it have been difficult for Miss Phelps to make a decision such as signing a consent in the state of mind that
you feel she was in?" his answer was, "I can't quite answer
your question in terms of 'would it be difficult for her'."
(Tr. 49)
4. He relies upon a repetitious request concerning the
time of day and suggests that such behavior is abnormal. It
occurs to counsel that Dana was waiting for the arrival of
a social worker preliminary to executing a consent to an
adoption. She had received a call the day before, but the
social worker could not inform her of the exact time that she
would arrive the following day. Such could well create some
anxiety or interest as to the time of arrival of the social
worker. We respectfully submit that the uncertainty as to
time of arrival and the normal anxieties that might exist
under such circumstances could prompt a repetitious request
for the time of day. Doubtless, many persons under trying
circumstances have solicited a frequent disclosure of time.
Such repetitious requests may be remotely characteristic of
an abnormal state of mind but are not conclusive in any way
of this fact. Dr. Clark was quick to qualify his answer by
stating categorically that such in and of itself would not
constitute incompetence. (Tr. 51, 52)
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5. The doctor could not answer regarding the degree of
competency that Dana might have in coping with specific
types of problems presented to her. (Tr. 53) The doctor
sums his testimony up inescapably with the words "I am not
saying she was incapable of a voluntary act." (Tr. 57)
Consider now in contrast the testimony of Dr. Hebertson
1. Dr. Hebertson was the attending physician. (Tr. 12)

2. He is a trained obstetrician, a member of the staff of
the University Hospital. (Tr. 76)
3. He was a personal choice of Dana Phelps; she having
become acquainted with him previously. (Tr. 12)
4. On the first visit Dana expressed to the doctor a
desire for adoption. (Tr. 77) Subsequently, an appointment
was arranged at her request with the licensed agency. (Tr.
14) Alternatives were discussed. (Tr. 78)
5. Dana reaffirmed her desire to go forward with an
adoption. (Tr. 79)
6. At no time did Dana negate such a desire. (Tr. 78,
79)
7. Dr. Hebertson made inquiry as to her medical history reaction to medications. (Tr. 79) He made no clinical
evaluations concerning adverse effects of demoral. He knew
of nothing to cause him to be concerned or reticent about
administering it to her. (Tr. 80) There was no adverse re-

11
action to such medication. Dana responded in the usual
fashion to demerol.
8. The doctor visited with her twice a day or on a number of occasions. (Tr. 82)
9. He carried on a meaningful conversation with her
both before and after the birth of the child and shortly after
the time for the execution of the release. (Tr. 82)
10. Dana's responses were appropriate, rational and responsive. (Tr. 82) The doctor and Dana chatted about the
ordinary things following surgery. (Tr. 83)
11. The doctor had seen her prior to the birth of the
child on at least ten occasions. (Tr. 84)
12. The medication given her was a small dose. (Tr. 88)
13. In the doctor's opinion, Dana was fully competent.
The primary effects of any medication had been passed at
the time of execution of the release. (Tr. 92, 93)
Now if Dana was unable to comprehend the consequences of her act and this fact were known or thought to be
by those closest to her, one may ask, "why did the brother
decline to stay in the room at the time the release was executed? Why did he make no attempt to stop the case worker
or counsel or confer with her? Why did he voluntarily leave
the room notwithstanding an invitation to stay, and why
did he fail to pursue any misgivings which he might have
with the caseworker upon her departure from Dana's hospital room? The answer is obvious.
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It is significant that Dana did carry on a meaningful
conversation, did receive the case worker, did interrogate
Mrs. Stewart concerning the contents of the document, how
it should be filled out and when and where the child would
be placed. It is also significant that Dana filled out the release and expressed reflief when the ordeal was passed.

In the case of Barnum 1.:s. R6idy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P. 2d
175, the Court observes that, generally speaking, there is
always present a form of duress when a consent to adoption
is executed but it is not duress of a type which renders void
such consent.
Admittedly, Dana was under some social pressure. She
was no doubt troubled and anxious. Her predicament was
understandable yet regrettable. Dana did what might be
expected. She made a disclosure of her predicament first to
her family. She then solicited the advice and help of a physician. She subsequently met with a social worker and then
a licensed agency representative, also a social worker. Nevertheless, the opinion and the decision were hers, not
theirs; and with rational judgment she elected to proceed
toward an adoption. The execution of the document of consent was but one in a series of steps which Dana had taken
leading toward an adoption of her child. If advice is construed as duress thereby rendering any act pursuant to such
advice void, then the valued purposes served by lawyers,
doctors and social workers would be nullified and each
troubled person would be left in a sea of doubt to flounder
and sink for lack of such advice and guidance.
Dana was not under such duress, restraint or undue influence at the time the decision was made to release the child
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for adoption and at the time of the execution of the consent
as to render her act involuntary and void. If indeed there
has been undue influence or duress, such has been brought
to bear subsequent to the critical acts herein and not as a
part of such acts. We invite the Court to consider the case of
Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235 and 364
P. 2d 1069. In that case where it appeared that the mother
voluntarily signed the document after having been thoroughly advised as to its legal effect and consequences, the ascertion of duress and coercion was not supported by the
evidence.
The trial court is charged by law with fairly considering the evidence and giving such weight thereto as is appropriate. In the instant case the court fairly considered the
testimony of the witnesses called in behalf of the parties,
their demeanor, their directness and candor, their professional ability, and the personal knowledge which they might
have in connection with Dana's situation. In doing so, the
court acted properly in finding that there was no undue influence, restraint, duress, menace or fraud.
POINT TWO
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IN SIGNING A RELEASE AND CONSENT OF
ADOPTION WAS A PRODUCT OF MUCH THOUGHT
AND MANY MONTHS OF CONSIDERATION AND
WAS THE CULMINATION OF A PREDETERMINED
COURSE OF ACTION.
The child in question was born on December 17, 1966,
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Consider the following facts:
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1. Prior to September of 1966 Dana conferred with her
brother, a doctor, in Price, Utah, concerning her problem,
having learned of her pregnancy in August of 1966. (Tr. 10)
2. In the latter part of September, 1966, she conferred
with Dr. Hebertson, an obstetrician and personal choice of
appellant. (Tr. 12)
3. At that time she discussed with Dr. Hebertson the
possible placement of the child for adoption. (Tr. 12) He
explained that she could go through the L.D.S. Church adoption agency, if she didn't want to go see Father Brusatto.
(Tr. 13) He advised her to place the child for adoption.
(Tr. 13)
Dr. Hebertson expressed a willingness to make an appointment with the L.D.S. Adoption Center if this was
Dana's choice. Dana responded that it was and asked him
to do so. (Tr. 14)
5. The doctor's notes revealed an expressed desire for
adoption. (Tr. 77)
6. The doctor discussed the alternatives available to
Dana. (Tr. 78)
7-She reaffirmed her desire to go forward with an adoption and did nothing to negate this desire. (Tr. 79)
8-The doctor saw Dana prior to the birth of the child on
at least ten occasions, and on those occasions "because of
her express desire for adoption" supported her in this decision. (Tr. 84)
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9. Dana on the single occasion of her conference with
Mrs. Stewart of the Defendant agency, occurring September
28, 1966, explored various alternatives available to her,
filled out various forms and applications, declined counseling. (Tr. 62)
10. Her next contact with Mrs. Stewart was on December 17, Hl66, by telephone at which time Mrs. Stewart asked
if she was ready to follow through on the plans that she had
previously made and Dana replied, "yes." Arrangements
were made for Mrs. Stewart to visit with her the following
day and to take the release. (Tr. 63)
11. On the 23rd day of September, 1966, Dana met with
Corinne Bridgewaters, a social worker for the University
Hospital. Dana came to her office. Mrs. Bridgewaters says
that "there was not too much to making this decision of
adoption. Dana seemed to have this already planned; and, of
course, I, after explaining my role asked Dana specifically
if this is what she wanted to do and then I went away from
this particular area of discussion and we talked about her
family ... I thought it was significant that Dana wanted to
place her baby and she said that she had heard about the
L.D.S. Relief Society and wanted to place her baby ... "
12. Some four months later, after the birth of the child,
Mrs. Bridgewaters visited with Dana, assumed that the release had not yet been signed, then inquired of her as to
whether or not she was ready "to sign the release." On this
occasion, to-wit: December 19th, Dana told Mrs. Bridgewaters that the release had been signed and Dana "seemed
to be relieved." She said, "I am glad it is all over." (Tr. 112)
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13. Subsequently, Dana ratified her action by signing a
second release document pertaining to the child's discharge
from the hospital. (Tr. 114, Exhibit P. 2, Page 6)
The weight and preponderance of the evidence supports
Respondent's contention that Plaintiff had pre-determined
to release her child and that the mere act of signing the release and relinquishment was the culmination of this predetermination rather than the beginning of her indecision.
POINT THREE
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS PLACED BY
THE AGENCY IN A SUITABLE AND PROPER HOME
FOR ADOPTION PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS BY
PLAINTIFF.
Appellant suggests that the record is void of any evidence concerning the placement of the child.
The child in question was placed by the agency in a
suitable and proper home and this fact was communicated
not only to the Appellant but is acknowledged by her in her
own testimony. We refer the Court to the testimony of Dana
Phelps. At some time after the birth of the child she approached the Relief Society and inquired if the baby was all
right. At that time Mrs. Stewart informed her that the baby
was in a home like "yours" (Dana's), a professional home,
that it would be best for you (Dana) to just leave the baby
where it is. (Tr. 22) Mrs. Stewart did not tell her where the
baby was located except in a very general way. She assured
her about the child's welfare and confirmed that it was a
kind of home that Dana would select for it. (Tr. 75)
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The Court is mindful that the respondent is a State
licensed Child Placement Agency and as such is subject to
regulation and review by the State Department of Public
Welfare. The agency operates under the rules, regulations
and standards prescribed by the Welfare Department and
is and was judicious in the selection of a home for placement
of a child in its care. We invite the Court's judicial knowledge of the licensing procedures and standards prescribed
for the operation of such agencies.
P01NT FOUR.
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ADDUCED, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PERMIT' TED TO REVOKE OR WITHDRAW CONSENT AS
PREVIOUSLY GIVEN.
We direct the Court's attention to the language of Exhibit "P" 3, entitled Release. This release is contractual in
form and in the most precise terms declares the mother's
fixed determination to place her child with the agency for
adoption. The mother agrees to not interfere with, nor attempt in any manner to locate the child, and by the terms of
the document foregoes all parental rights and control over
the child. The mother declares a previously informed intention, after carefully considering the matter, to never claim
any right, title or interest in and to the child and authorizes
the agency to forthwith place the child in a suitable and
proper home for adoption. The mother declares that she has
carefully read the release and knows the contents thereof
and signs the same as her own free act and deed.
It was based upon this agreement that the agency undertook placement of the child in a "professional home."
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The mother's consent to adoption was voluntarily given and
was acted upon by the adopting parents. As such, it cannot
be withdrawn without good cause. So the court has held in
In Re Adoption of D ...... 122 Utah, 525, 252 P. 2d 229.
A special point should be made that the release aforementioned was executed in strict conformance to the statutes of Utah. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-30-4.
Appellant suggests that the case of Taylor vs. Waddaups, found in 121 Utah 279, 241 P. 2d 157 is not supportive of this proposition. We respectfully submit that the
Taylor vs. Waddaups Case involves circumstances in which
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 7830-4 were not complied with. In other words, no valid consent had in the first instance been given. As such, the case
is clearly distinguishable on all points of law. It should be
pointed out that the Waddaups case was not an agency adoption and did not conform to the statues for non-agency placement. In that case, the court could not conclude other than
it did.
Distinguish the Waddaups Case from the instant case.
Dana Phelps executed a valid release, having been fully advised as to the legal consequences therein. After having executed the release and in reliance upon Appellant's voluntary
act is so doing, the respondent placed the child forthwith in
a suitable and proper home.
This Court in the case of In Re Adoption of D ..... .
122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d 229 adopts the rules set forth in
the Nevada case of Ex Parte Schultz, 64 Nevada 264, 181
P. 2d 585, as follows:
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"The court therein refers to four fundamental
doctrines inherent in our ideas of justice, all of which
militate against any arbitrary right of appellant to
revoke her consent:
First, Principles of contract require that where
it has been represented to the respondents initially
by the grandmother and later by the appellant that
they could adopt a child if they would assume parental responsibility and take care of her, which offer
they accepted, have performed and are ready, willing
and able to continue, prevent the arbitrary revocation of the contract. The authorities uniformly discussed the agreement to adopt as a contract... After
acceptance such a contract is enforceable against the
adopting parents and ought to be enforceable by
them.
Second, Estoppel and other principles of equity
under the circumstances would preclude a court from
assisting appellant to regain the custody of the child.
The contention that no rights have intervened and no
one has relied on the representations to his detriment
show a singular lack of understanding of human
nature. It is confirmed by experience and common
sense that when people who desire a child ... once fix
their parental instincts and emotions upon a child
which has been rejected or forsaken by others they
have great love, affection and concern for such child.
There are those who maintain that under such circumstances the parental love and desire to protect
and care for the child is even more intense than in
the case of natural parents ... A realistic appraisal
of the situation compels us to recognize that persons
such as respondents who have done what they have
for this child must be assumed to have an affection
and attachment for her at least equally important to
property rights. Viewed in that light there certainly
have intervened "vested rights" and respondents
have in reliance upon representations made placed
themselves in a different position, the undoing of
which would cause irreparable injury in the most

.
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real sense. Appellant not only stood by and knowingly permitted but actually encouraged such circumstances to eventuate and further formally executed
the consent to adoption. Under such facts she should
in equity and good conscience be estopped to reassert her rights to custody.
Third, the welfare of the child ... when questions of child custody arise the welfare of the child
and her chances for a suitable home environment and
advantages in nurture, training and education to the
end that she may live and be conditioned for a well
adjusted happy and useful life are important factors
to consider. In fact, it is often stated that such considerations are of the paramount importance. In the
case of Walton vs. Koffrnan, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d
97 Mr. Justice Wade analyses the antecedent cases
of this court regarding contests over children and
cogently sets forth this principle but recognizes that
the right of the natural parent may be surrendered
or lost. When a parent has failed to give the child
the attention and love normally to be expected, has
abandoned its care to others and by irresponsible
conduct shown an unwillingness or an inability to
measure up to parental responsibility these matters
may be taken into consideration by the court in connection with other factors in determining the right
of custody.
Fourth, public policy favors the adoption of
children who are left without parental refuge. Once
a child has been cast adrift and is without responsible parental care, the policy of the law should be to
assist in every way in establishing a satisfactory
parent/child and family relationship. Adoptive parents should not be discouraged by a construction of
the law which would cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a child because of the knowledge that the fate of their efforts would be at the will
of the natural parent." In Re Adoption of D ..... .
122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d 229.
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POINT FIVE
TO ALLOW REVOCATION OF A RELEASE AND
CONSENT TO ADOPTION WHERE SUCH IS PROPERLY GIVEN TO A LICENSED AGENCY IN CONFORMANCE WITH STATE LAW WOULD BE CONTRARY
TO THE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY OF THIS
STATE.
Some Courts have stated that a consent once having
been freely and formally given may not be revoked except
for fraud or duress and that in the absence of fraud, coercion
or other cause rendering the mother's consent inoperative,
the fact that after signing an adoption agreement she has
changed her mind and attempted to withdraw her consent
would not relieve her of her agreement. See Am. Jur. 2d
898. Dana Phelps entered into a contract for the placement
of her child (Exhibit "B" 3). Based upon the covenants and
agreements therein contained the agency received the child
and thereupon placed said child in a suitable and proper
home for adoption. This was done in conformance with the
standards and rules of the State Welfare Department and
in compliance with the provisions of Utah law as they relate
to agency placements.
Interestingly Appellant concedes that an adoption consent may not be revoked without cause and then only if the
adoption proceedings have not been commenced. He points
to the case of In Re Trimble's Adoption, 16 Utah 2d 188,
398 P. 2d 25, in which the Court held that an adoption proceeding is commenced by filing a petition with the Clerk of
the District Court. We respectfully submit that the distinction between the Trimble Case and the case at hand is in the
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character of the placement. The Trimble Case was a nonagency adoption involving a question of jurisdiction between
the Juvenile and the District Court. Under the circumstances
of the Trimble Case the adoption consent was taken in Open
Court after the filing of a petition for adoption. Not so in
the case of an agency placement; in agency placements the
proceeding is commenced when the first requirement imposed by law is performed leading in a natural way toward a
concluded adoption. This requirement is the execution of the
mother's release, not before the Court, as in the case of an independent adoption but before an officer authorized to take
acknowledgements as required by Utah Code Annotated,
1953, Section 78-30-4. In establishing procedures for the
execution of a release to an agency the legislature recognizes the social training, legal controls, exact standards, and
proper motivation of the agency in performing its necessary
public service. It is apparent to any informed person that
the social good and service performed by licensed agencies
fills a void which would otherwise exist in this state. The
agency provides social service to unwed mothers and placement services to children who are born out of wedlock or
otherwise left without proper parental supervision. The
services of the agency can be invoked by the Court or by
voluntary action of a distressed individual, in this case,
Appellant.
The function of the agency is to stabilize family life
and to provide social welfare help where such need exists.
Essential to the operation of the agency is a flow of
adoptive parent applicants. To assure this flow, the agencies,
under the direction of the Welfare Department have estab-
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lished standards and procedures and have, heretofore, represented that upon the family meeting the standards
prescribed such applicants would be eligible to adopt a child.
Consider any given case-an applicant to adopt a child solicits the cooperation of the agency. Such applicants establishes his or their qualifications for adoption. Based upon
such standards the agency in due course places a child with
the applicant for adoption. The applicants thereupon take
the child into their home, solely provide for its needs, shower
said child with love, affection, parental supervision and
guidance, and create for the child a socially desirable family
unit, indeed an essential environment for the child's normal
development.
We respectfully submit that were it the law that the
placement could not be regarded as stable and essentially
secure from the first moment, and if the natural mother
could "willy-nilly" rescind and revoke her consent without
reasonable cause or basis the applications for adoption
would be so diminished and impaired as to destroy the effectiveness of adoption practices in this community. Such
was not the intention of our legislature and is not the rule
which has been adopted heretofore by this Court. Were persons desirous, even under such undesirable circumstances to
adopt they would tend to withhold their affection, their
normal parental responses, their emotional outpourings,
and their means until such time as the adoption has become
final. Nothing could be more disastrous to a child in its for"'
mative years; indeed nothing could be more socially disastrous to our community.
It was with this thought in mind that the legislature
enacted the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec-
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tion 55-10-42 which provide "no parent or guardian or other
person who by instrument in writing surrenders or has surrendered heretofore the custody of a child to any children's
aid society or institution shall thereafter contrary to the
terms of such instrument be entitled to custody or control or
authority over or any right to interfere with any such child
and the same conditions shall prevail where the child is or
has been delivered to a children's aid society or institution
by action of any proper court."
The foregoing statute was enacted in 1903 and continued as a statutory declaration until 1965, at which time
the same was repealed. We suggest that the repeal was
through inadvertence on the part of the legislature. The
Court will recall that in 1965 the legislature drafted a new
Juvenile Court Act. The foregoing statute was contained in
the old Juvenile Court Act and was the victim of a blanket
repeal of some 62 sections of the former law.
An examination of the statutes repealed at that time
will show that in a substantial part all such statutes related
to administration and to procedures followed by the Juvenile
Court under the old act. We respectfully submit that the
repeal of this important section of substantive law was not
a reflection of the intention of the legislature but was accidental and incidental to a revision of administrative practices. Said section was a substantive principle buried in a
procedural section of the Juvenile Court Act.
Notwithstanding the repeal of Utah Code Annotated,
1953, Section 55-10-42 the principle and concept underlying
and expressed by said section has been adopted by our Utah
Court as a part of its substantive case law. We refer the
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Court to the case of Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society of
Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029, In Re Adoption of
D ...... 252 P. 2d 223, 122 Utah 525; Jacob vs. State by and
through Public W eljare Commission, 7 Utah 2d 304, 322 P.
2d 720.
It is interesting to note that our Utah Legislature
while inadvertently repealing Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Section 55-10-42 nevertheless reflected in other legislation
an affirmative intention to strengthen and secure stable
child placement. It is significant that in 1965, Section 78-304 was amended. In the amendment the legislature provided :

... A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such parent's child, and a
minor parent shall have the power to release such
parent's control or custody of such parent's child to
any agency licensed to receive children for placement
or adoption under Chapter 8, Title 55, and, such a
consent or release so executed shall be valid and have
the same force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor parent, having so
executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same
upon such person's attaining the age of maturity.
It would be an incongruous thing to suggest that an
adult parent could revoke her consent without cause whereas a minor, near adulthood, could not. Obviously this was not
the legislative intent. The legislative intent was to bar disaffirmance and revocation and to lend further stability to
the placement of a child. Such intent is supportive of a similar intent in all areas of adoption-placement practice.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that Dana Phelps
freely and voluntarily relinquished the custody and control
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of her child to the respondent with full knowledge and understanding of the legal consequences of her act. The Court
is faced with the alternatives of upholding the findings of
the trial court and the precedence of this court, thereby
serving the best interest of the child and further stabilizing
adoption placement services in this State, or returning the
child to a 35 year old unmarried woman who cannot and
does not offer to the child a normal family life and a welladjusted father-mother environment. Respondent, in its
own behalf, on behalf of the adopting parents of the infant
Phelps, on behalf of adoptive applicants similarly situated
elsewhere, on behalf of needful children, and on behalf of
licensed agencies throughout the State of Utah earnestly
solicits the Court's consideration of these matters and their
import upon the infant Phelps and upon adoption practices
within this State in affirming the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Earl S. Spafford

